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REGULAR EDUCATION TEACHERS FORMULATING SPECIAL 
EDUCATION PLANS: 
M.L. V. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THE IDEA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world of special education is governed today by a body of 
statutory law known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA). 1 The IDEA mandates that each special education student receive 
an "individualized education plan" (IEP) specifically formulated to 
accommodate that student's individual needs. The IDEA has many 
detailed requirements, one of which demands the inclusion of a regular 
education teacher, or one who teaches "regular" rather than "special" 
education classes, at IEP development meetings. This requirement is 
primarily aimed at giving special education students the opportunity to 
integrate at an appropriate level into regular education classrooms. The 
regular education teacher adds an important perspective to the IEP 
regarding the needs and capabilities of a student with special needs 
among his regular education peers. 
The importance of the regular education teacher's involvement in the 
development of a special education plan drives the main issue in M.L. v. 
Federal Way School District? M.L. was a young kindergarten student 
whose experience in a regular preschool suggested the possibility of at 
least some integration into a regular kindergarten classroom.3 The 
presence at his IEP development meeting of a regular education teacher, 
particularly his regular preschool teacher, would have been extremely 
valuable in formulating optimal educational opportunities for M.L. The 
failure of the Federal Way School District to include a regular education 
teacher in M.L.'s IEP development meeting constituted a procedural 
violation of the IDEA. 
This case note deals with judicial treatment of IDEA procedural 
violations and, in particular, the Ninth Circuit's treatment of a school 
1. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2005). 
2. 394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2941 (2005). 
3. I d. at 637 
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district's failure to include a regular education teacher in an IEP. Should 
courts automatically invalidate an IEP for which the development 
process was procedurally flawed, or should invalidation also require a 
showing that the procedural error caused substantive harm? Should the 
question turn on the nature of the procedural error? IDEA procedural 
violations constitute a somewhat undeveloped area of law, and yet 
emerging trends in federal courts lean toward at least some analysis of 
substantive harm. M.L. represents one of very few federal cases 
addressing the regular education teacher requirement of the IDEA. Judge 
Alarcon, writing for the Ninth Circuit in M.L., adopts an unconventional 
approach that leaves educators, students and courts still wondering what 
treatment IDEA procedural violations ought to receive in federal courts. 
Under his approach, procedural defect precludes the court's review of 
substantive harm. The other two judges in the three-judge panel 
disagreed with this analytical framework, and called for a more 
conventional harmless error component as part of the analysis. 
A reading of the M.L. 's majority, concurring and dissenting 
opinions begs the questions: Is there still a gap in the law? What do the 
procedural requirements of the IDEA, such as the regular education 
teacher requirement, mean? How should courts, in the Ninth Circuit and 
elsewhere, respond to such violations in the future? Although the Ninth 
Circuit addresses these questions in M.L., it provides few clear answers. 
This case note addresses these questions from a variety of perspectives. 
Part II provides important background information, detailing the 
relevant provisions of the statute and describing the legislative history of 
the regular education teacher requirement in the 1997 amendments to 
the IDEA. Part III offers the facts and procedural history of M.L. and 
places the Federal Way School District's procedural violation in the 
context of the legislative requirement. Part IV canvasses federal case law, 
controlling and otherwise, related to the regular education teacher 
requirement. Finally, Part V asks how this requirement is viewed and 
implemented in public schools throughout the country. Part VI 
constitutes a brief conclusion. 
II. THE REGULAR EDUCATION TEACHER REQUIREMENT AND ITS 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
A. The Statute 
The IDEA's many requirements are all designed to provide 
educational opportunity, or a "free appropriate public education" 
(FAPE), for children with special needs. The development of an IEP 
offers individual attention to each child with special needs and results in 
2] M.L. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DIST. AND THE IDEA 641 
the creation of an educational plan tailored to the child's specific needs. 
As a part of this effort, the IDEA spells out exactly who should participate 
in the development of the IEP. According to the federal statute, the IEP 
team should include parents, special education teachers or providers, 
other school officials, and "not less than [one] regular education 
teacher. . . (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular 
education environment)."4 The IDEA further describes the regular 
education teacher's participation in IEP development as follows: 
A regular education teacher of the child, as a member of the IEP Team, 
shall, to the extent appropriate, participate in the development of the 
IEP of the child, including the determination of appropriate positive 
behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, and the 
determination of supplementary aids and services, program 
modifications, and support for school personnel .... 5 
Thus, the IDEA qualifies the regular education teacher requirement 
in two ways. First, the regular education teacher's involvement is 
necessary only if the student has a chance of participating in a regular 
education environment. Second, the regular education teacher is 
required to participate only "to the extent appropriate," or to the extent 
to which the regular education teacher might be needed to offer 
suggestions for positive support.6 
B. History of the Statute 
The legislative history of the IDEA and its amendments offers some 
explanation of Congress' reasoning and intent in both including and also 
limiting the regular education teacher requirement. First, including a 
regular education teacher on the IEP team is consistent with the IDEA's 
effort to mainstream students with special needs. The requirement also 
provides an opportunity for necessary collaboration between the 
student's regular education and special education teachers and invites the 
regular education teacher's necessary perspective on the needs of the 
special education student in a regular education classroom. Finally, a 
reading of the legislative history of the IDEA brings into focus the 
legislators' intent that a regular education teacher's involvement be 
limited to those aspects of the IEP which are relevant to this teacher's 
interaction with and teaching of the student. 
First, involving regular education teachers in the schooling of special 
education students is a necessary aspect of mainstreaming these students. 
4. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(l)(B) (composition of the IEP team) (italics added). 
5. Jd. at§ 1414(d)(3)(C) (requirement with respect to regular education teacher). 
6. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 149 (May 20, 1996). 
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In the process of creating and passing the 1997 amendments to the 
IDEA, Congress found that: 
[T]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities 
[should be] educated with children who are nondisabled and that 
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with 
disabilities from the regular educational environment [should occur] 
only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education 
in regular classes with the use of special education and related services 
or supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.? 
Various testimonials before congressional committees and 
subcommittees reflected a general understanding that the involvement of 
a regular education teacher in the creation of a student's special 
educational plan is part of a larger effort to assimilate disabled students 
into regular classes where possible. The testimonials also highlighted the 
benefits of this mainstreaming. Including special needs students in 
regular classrooms gives them preparation for "real life"8 and can even 
result in increased academic performance for all students.9 Furthermore, 
the integration of regular education and special education students helps 
"demystify special education and lessen any stigma attached to [special 
education students]."10 These benefits and others are derived from the 
simple placement of a special needs student in a regular classroom. 
Second, as special education students are placed in regular 
classrooms, it is vital that the teachers of these regular classrooms 
participate in the creation of their students' educational plans. Where 
regular education teachers are directing some of a student's daily 
education, an IEP created solely by special education teachers would be 
particularly inadequate in helping students with disabilities "to be 
successful in inclusive settings." 11 Regular education teachers can provide 
7. I d. at 38 
8. Sen. Subcomm. on Disability Policy of the Comm. on Lab. & Human Resources, 
Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, 104th Cong. 98 (May II, 1995) (testimony of a special 
education teacher, Ms. Matty Rodriguez-Walling) [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearings of the 
IDEA]. 
9. Sen. Comm. on Lab. and Human Resources, Reauthorization of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 105th Cong. 81 (Jan. 29, 1997) (testimony of a Pittsburgh, PA school 
board member, Elisabeth T. Healey) [hereinafter Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act]; Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8, at !04, 107 (testimony of a special 
education teacher, Ms. Sharon Gonder). 
10. Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8. at 99 (testimony of a special education 
teacher, Ms. Matty Rodriguez· Walling). 
II. H.R. Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Comm. on Economic and 
Educational Opportunities, Hearings on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, I 04th Cong. 
215 (june 27, 1995) (testimony of an early childhood special education teacher, Miss Marlise E. 
Stieglitz). 
2] M.L. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DIST. AND THE IDEA 643 
important perspective on "what is possible in the regular class and what 
is needed for success" in an integrated setting. 12 Collaboration between 
regular and special education teachers helps avoid the well-documented 
problem of "unnecessary duplication of instruction and in some cases 
conflicting instructional programs ... [which] impede the academic 
progress of students with disabilities." 13 Likewise, appropriate behavior 
management techniques can be developed where needed. 14 Inclusion of 
regular education teachers in the development of the educational plan 
helps prevent these teachers from feeling "that their hands are tied when 
it comes to children with disabilities" 15 and begins the important process 
of "giving teachers the tools that they need to teach all children."16 
Finally, the legislative history of the IDEA amendments and 
reauthorization clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to limit regular 
education teachers' involvement in IEP formulation to an extent 
proportional to their involvement with the special education student. A 
House Report summarizes the statute's intent as follows: 
Very often, regular education teachers play a central role in the 
education of children with disabilities. In that regard the bill provides 
that regular education teachers participate on the IEP Team, but this 
provision is to be construed in light of the bill's proviso that the regular 
education teacher, to the extent appropriate, participate in the 
development of the IEP of the child. The Committee recognizes the 
reasonable concern that the provision including the regular education 
teacher might create an obligation that the teacher participate in all 
aspects of the IEP Team's work. The Committee does not intend that to 
be the case and only intends it to be to the extent appropriateY 
This limitation essentially avoids adding "unnecessarily to the 
demands on teachers." 18 One Senate Report describes the requirement as, 
"to the extent appropriate, at least one regular education teacher who 
knows the child or is familiar with the curriculum of the child, if the child 
12. Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, supra n. 9, at 61 
(testimony of judith E. Heumann, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services). 
13. Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8 (available at 1995 WL 283270) (written 
testimony of Dr. Herbert Rieth, Professor and Chair of the Department of Special Education at 
Vanderbilt University). 
14. 142 Con g. Rec. H6083 (daily ed. June I 0, 1996) (House debates, representative from 
Hawaii) 
15. Jd. 
16. 143 Cong. Rec. H2498 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (House debates, representative from 
California). 
17. H.R. Rpt. I 05-95 at I 03 (May 13, 1997). 
18. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 49 (May 20, 1996) 
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is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment."19 
Thus, when Congress directed the inclusion of a regular education 
teacher on the IEP team, it likely intended that this teacher be one 
familiar with the specific student and that the teacher's participation be 
limited to relevant portions of the IEP. 
III. M.L. V. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
A. Statement of Facts 
M.L. was a five-year-old kindergarten student in the Federal Way 
School District (FWSD) suffering from disabilities including autism, 
mental retardation, and macrocephaly. 20 Prior to his enrollment in an 
FWSD elementary school, M.L. attended three years of preschool in the 
Tukwila School District. 21 His preschool class was an "integrated class"22 
and, therefore, included both regularly developing children as well as a 
few disabled students.23 During his time in preschool, M.L. received full-
time aid from a one-on-one assistant, and gradually M.L. learned to 
participate to some degree with other students in classroom exercises. 24 
These preschool years also saw increasing aggressiveness in M.L.'s 
interactions with others.25 
Each year the Tukwila School District was required to create an IEP 
for M.L. as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A).26 The IEP served to 
measure M.L.'s educational progress and determine the level and type of 
special educational services to be provided for him during the following 
year. 27 M.L's IEP team in the Tukwila School District suggested 
placement in an integrated kindergarten class for the school year 2000-
2001.28 They also outlined other therapy and educational services he 
would receive in combination with his classroom time.29 
M.L.'s family moved from the Tukwila School District into the 
FWSD shortly before his enrollment in kindergarten.30 The FWSD opted 
19. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
20. M.L., 394 F.3d at 636-37. 
21. Id. at 637. 
22. I d. 
23. I d. at 637 n. 4 
24. I d. at 637. 
25. I d. 
26. I d. 
27. ld. 
28. Id. at 638. 
29. I d. 
30. /d. 
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to apply the Tukwila IEP until the end of September when it would 
expire, and M.L. was accordingly enrolled in an integrated kindergarten 
class.31 M.L. attended this class for five days. Each assistant hired to work 
one-on-one with M.L. quit after one day.32 M.L.'s mother, who attended 
the kindergarten class during these days, expressed concern to the 
teacher that other children were teasing M.L., though she admitted she 
was unsure whether he was actually affected by the teasing since he was 
wearing headphones and listening to music while the other children were 
teasing him33 M.L. did not return to the integrated kindergarten class 
after the first five days. His mother refused the FWSD's suggestion of 
enrolling M.L. in a class designed for disabled students, preferring 
instead a setting which would allow for greater interaction with regular 
education students. 34 
In early October shortly after the Tukwila IEP had expired, M.L.'s 
mother met with several specialists to evaluate M.L.'s need for special 
education services. This group of specialists assessed M.L.'s abilities and 
created a report recommending his placement in a special education 
program, but again, M.L.'s mother objected to this type of plan.35 In 
November, FWSD officials attempted to arrange an IEP meeting with 
M.L,'s parents, but his mother insisted she and her husband could 
neither attend nor participate via conference call in an IEP on any day 
between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Therefore, when the IEP 
meeting was held, neither of M.L.'s parents attended. Also, no regular 
education teacher participated.36 The IEP team reviewed M.L.'s school 
records and determined he should be placed in a smaller classroom 
designed for autistic students.37 The FWSD mailed this decision to M.L.'s 
parents with a letter inviting them to help refine or otherwise discuss the 
IEP. At this point, M.L.'s parents sought a due process hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).38 
B. Application of Legislative Intent to the Facts of M.L. 
The legislative history of the IDEA's regular education teacher 
requirement has clear implications for M.L.'s story. Prior to his brief stint 
in a regular education kindergarten classroom, M.L. spent three years in 
31. ld. 
32. I d. 
33. I d. 
34. Jd. at 639. 
35. !d. 
36. I d. at 640. 
37. ld. at 640-41. 
38. I d. at 641. 
646 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2006 
a regular preschool, which suggested that he should have the option of 
integration. One might argue that M.L.'s disabilities, though manageable 
in a preschool classroom, have the potential to make integration more 
difficult with each passing year. On the other hand, M.L. was still in 
kindergarten, and aside from his brief five-day stay in that classroom, 
there had been no indication that he could not continue on a regular 
education path during his kindergarten year. The legislature intended 
IDEA to require the involvement of a teacher who knows the potential of 
a student with special needs, as well as the limitations of a regular 
classroom, in the development of his IEP.39 The failure to include a 
regular education teacher, such as M.L.'s preschool teacher or at least the 
kindergarten teacher that knew him briefly, deprived M.L's IEP of the 
regular education teacher perspective, thus defeating the legislative goals 
of providing effective mainstreaming benefits to special needs students. 
C. Analysis of M.L. by the Courts 
The procedural history of M.L. presents somewhat conflicting 
standards for upholding this legislative intent. The due process hearing 
was held in February 2001 and ran for eight days. The ALJ determined 
the IEP team was "appropriately constituted."40 Then, M.L.'s parents 
appealed the ALJ's decision to the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, arguing that the FWSD had failed to 
meet the IDEA's procedural requirements since no regular education 
teacher was on the IEP team.41 The district court granted summary 
judgment to the FWSD, finding the IEP team adequate and stating that 
"[e]ven if ... the district's failure to include a regular education teacher of 
M.L.'s on the IEP team amounted to a procedural violation of the IDEA, 
such violation would not necessarily constitute the denial of a FAPE."42 
Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, M.L.'s parents argued that the lack of 
a regular education teacher on the IEP team was a significant procedural 
violation.43 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case as a three-judge panel 
and produced an opinion, a concurrence, and a dissent.44 The majority 
opinion, penned by Judge Alarcon, held that the FWSD's failure to 
39. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 149 (May 20, 1996). 
40. I d. The issue of the parents' non-attendance at the IEP meeting was addressed by the ALJ, 
who found M.L.'s parents' argument as to why they could not attend to be not credible. Id. at 640. It 
does not appear that ML's parents raised this issue at later proceedings. Id. at 641-42. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 641-42. 
44. Id. at 636, 651 (Gould, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 658 
(Clifton, J., dissenting). 
--··-----~~--~-- -----------------------
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include a regular education teacher on the IEP team constituted fatal 
procedural error which invalidated the IEP.45 The opinion adopted what 
the concurring opinion labels a "per se" standard; this particular 
procedural defect is found to invalidate the IEP regardless of its 
substantive effect.46 The concurring opinion agreed with the majority's 
decision to invalidate the IEP but preferred to apply harmless error 
review, and thus arrived at this result by concluding that not only had 
there been a procedural violation, but also that this error caused harm to 
M.LY The dissent also preferred the harmless error analysis, but in its 
application arrived at an opposite result, arguing that the lack of a regular 
education teacher on the IEP team constituted harmless error in this 
case.48 
IV. FEDERAL CASE LAW BACKGROUND FOR M.L. 
Because the particular question of procedural error at issue in M.L. 
has not been definitively answered by the Supreme Court, the M.L. 
majority opinion included a review of several cases dealing with various 
kinds of procedural violations of the IDEA.49 The issue is not one which 
frequently arises in federal court, thus the M.L. court's discussion was 
somewhat limited, relying primarily on Ninth Circuit cases and a 
Supreme Court case. The concurring opinion included a footnote listing 
several cases from other circuits.5° Federal case law on procedural 
violation of the IDEA is not vast, possibly because students, parents and 
school districts bring complaints before ALJs before bringing them to 
federal court as a last resort. 
A thorough survey of federal case law on this issue is useful in 
recognizing trends among those cases which do reach federal court. This 
section is divided into three parts. The first part surveys cases in which 
federal courts have addressed various types of procedural violations of 
the IDEA and the effect of such violations on the substantive promise of 
the IDEA that each child receive a FAPE. The second part surveys those 
few cases which specifically address the failure to include a regular 
education teacher on the IEP team. Finally, the third part compares all of 
that case law with M.L., arguing that Judge Alarcon's approach is 
somewhat unconventional and leaves room for substantially different 
45. !d. at 651. 
46. Id. at 651 (Gould,)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
47. Id. at 651-52 (Gould,)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
48. I d. at 658 (Clifton,)., dissenting). 
49. !d. at 644-48. 
50. !d. at 654 n. 6 (Gould,)., concurring). 
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interpretations. 
A. Federal Court Analysis of Procedural Violation of the IDEA Generally 
1. U.S. Supreme Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Education v. Rowlei1 
is commonly recognized as the Supreme Court guidance on procedural 
violation of the IDEA. 52 It is interesting, however, that the main issue in 
Rowley, the distinction between maximizing the educational potential of 
a special education student and simply providing some educational 
benefit, was not procedural at all. 53 As a secondary part of the opinion, 
the Court addressed the question of what role courts should play in 
reviewing administrative decisions under the Act.54 The Court 
recognized that the Act is much more specific in delineating procedural 
requirements than substantive rights and concluded, therefore, that 
Congress specifically intended procedural compliance as well as 
substantive.55 Thus, the Rowley Court dictated that reviewing courts ask 
(a) if the State has complied with procedural requirements, and (b) if the 
IEP, created through these procedures, is reasonably calculated to benefit 
the student.56 
As the Court applied this two-part inquiry to Rowley itself, it 
addressed the first question in less than a single sentence, briefly noting 
that the case included no findings that the school district had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the Act. 57 Thus, in Rowley, 
the Supreme Court did not even apply a total analytical framework for 
procedural error. Since no later case has caused the Supreme Court to 
address the issue of procedural violation of the IDEA, other courts have 
been left to apply this standard in a variety of ways. 
51. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
52. See e.g. Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 497 (6th ed., 
Wadsworth 2005) ("As stated in Rowley, a reviewing court must make sure that procedures are 
followed."); see also Mitchell L. Yell, The Law and Special Education 153 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1998) 
("The first principle of the Rowley test establishes the importance of adherence to the procedural 
aspects of a FAPE."). 
53. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203; see Alexander & Alexander, supra n. 52, at 499 (describing the 
rule of Rowley as follows: "The 'Free Appropriate Public Education' clause of the EAHCA does not 
require a State to maximize the potential of each special-needs child."). 
54. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204-08. 
55. Id. at 205-06. 
56. I d. at 206-07. 
57. I d. at 209 ("Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had 
failed to comply with the procedures of the Act .... "). 
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2. The Ninth Circuit 
Amanda /. ex rel. Annette /. v. Clark County School District58 raised 
the important issue of parental involvement in IEP formulation. Parental 
involvement is one of the hallmarks of the IDEA, and the right of parents 
to participate in directing the education of their special needs child is 
carefully guarded by a variety of procedural requirements.59 Therefore, 
courts may invalidate IEPs in cases where parents have been denied this 
participation.60 In Amanda]., the Ninth Circuit addressed only the first 
question of the Rowley analysis, finding procedural violations that 
effectively denied Amanda's parents the right to participate fully in her 
IEP development and consequently denied Amanda of a FAPE.61 While 
the court acknowledged that "[n]ot every procedural violation ... is 
sufficient to support a finding that the child in question was denied a 
F APE,"62 it asserted that a child is denied a F APE if procedural violations 
cause "loss of educational opportunity," infringement upon parental 
right to participate, or "deprivation of educational benefits."63 
Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School District No. 
6964 also dealt with both failure to include parents in IEP development 
and failure to include a particular teacher (a special education teacher, 
not a regular education teacher) on the IEP team that knew the student 
well. The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to include the parents and 
teacher in question was a procedural violation which denied the student a 
FAPE.65 Following the analytical framework from Amanda/., the court 
58. 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001). 
59. Id. at 882 ("Among the most important procedural safeguards are those that protect the 
parents' right to be involved in the development of their child's educational plan."); see e.g. Rowley, 
458 U.S. at 205-06 ("It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much 
emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of 
participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the 
resulting IEP against a substantive standard."); see also Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, 
Special Education and the Law: A Guide for Practitioners 79-80 (Corwin Press, Inc. 2003) (explaining 
that the IDEA gives parents "unprecedented" rights to participate in the special education planning 
of their children); Yell, supra n. 52 at 186 (stating that parental involvement in the IEP process was 
one of Congress' most important goals in the 1997 IDEA amendments). 
60. See Yell, supra n, 52 at 172 ("'EPs developed without parental input have been invalidated 
(citation omitted)."). 
61. Amanda f., 267 F.3d at 895 (stating that since the procedural violations denied Amanda of 
a FAPF., the court need not address whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to offer educational 
benefit). 
62. !d. at 892. 
63. !d. (citations omitted). 
64. 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003). 
65. Id. at 1076. 
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decided that it need not address the second prong of Rowley.66 The court 
specifically addressed the teacher requirements of the IDEA as a part of 
its analysis and determined that the "IDEA requires the persons most 
knowledgeable about the child to attend the IEP meeting."67 
3. Sister Circuits 
Other circuits have also faced the question of how to apply Rowley to 
cases alleging procedural violation of the IDEA. Courts have typically 
addressed whether these procedural violations resulted in the loss of a 
F APE to the student. A reading of these various cases reveals a consistent 
trend that where there is no showing that a student was denied a F APE, 
the court will not find that a procedural error invalidated the IEP. Thus, 
it is unlikely that those students and their parents will be able to obtain 
relief in the federal court system without demonstrating lost educational 
opportunity or lack of parental participation, and the resultant denial of a 
FAPE. 
For example, the Fourth Circuit in MM determined that a school 
district's failure to finalize an IEP by the beginning of the school year 
constituted procedural defect, stating that " [ w] hen such a procedural 
defect exists, we are obliged to assess whether it resulted in the loss of an 
educational opportunity for the disabled child, or whether, on the other 
hand, it was a mere technical contravention of the IDEA."68 In this 
instance, the court found procedural defect but did not find that lost 
educational opportunity resulted from this defect. 69 In another case in 
the same year, the Fourth Circuit went on to create an "actual 
interference" standard, stating that the court could not award relief to 
parents without "a showing that the violation actually interfered with the 
provision of a FAPE to the disabled child."70 Each of these cases cited 
Rowley for underlying principles expressed by the Supreme Court, but 
neither expressly followed the Rowley two-part analysis. Likewise, the 
Tenth Circuit cited Rowley for the principle that the FAPE requirement is 
satisfied if the child receives educational benefit. 71 Despite its reliance on 
66. Id. at 1079. 
67. Id. at 1076 (citations omitted). 
68. MM ex rei DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County. 303 F.3d 523,533 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Gadsby ex rei. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F .3d 940, 956 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
69. ld. at 535. 
70. DiBuo ex rei.DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcester County. 309 F3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added) (granting no relief to parents where the IEP team opted not to consider services 
requested by the parents since the team had determined the student to be ineligible to receive these 
services). 
71. T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1091 (lOth Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002). 
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Rowley, the court then addressed procedural violation by stating, 
"[p ]rocedural defects alone do not constitute a violation of the right to a 
FAPE unless they result in the loss of an educational opportunity."72 
Some circuits addressed the Rowley test more explicitly, applying it 
with varying degrees of specificity and exactness. For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit directly stated the test as articulated in Rowley, but 
found in applying this test that despite the presence of procedural error, 
the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. 73 The 
court expressly stated, with regard to the effect of these two prongs on 
each other, that "the court must consider the impact of the procedural 
defect, and not merely the defect per se."74 
Also, the Sixth Circuit applied the Rowley test in much the same way 
as the Ninth Circuit, by addressing only the first prong?5 In fact, the 
court was not content with merely determining whether there had been 
procedural violation, but rather saw the question as having a substantive 
element.76 Thus, the court not only determined that the school district's 
failure to hold a particular IEP meeting constituted procedural violation 
but also determined that this defect had denied the student a FAPE. 
Upon making these determinations, the court concluded that addressing 
the second Rowley prong was unnecessary?7 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether 
procedural error (in this case, the failure to follow a few technical 
requirements of an IEP) could alone invalidate the IEP?8 It cited Rowley 
but stated the first part of the two-part test somewhat differently. Rather 
than merely asking if procedural error existed, the court asked if "a 
procedural violation of the IDEA produced substantive harm."79 In this 
instance, the court found that the parents had not made a showing of 
substantive harm.80 Despite variations in the technical application of the 
Rowley test, each federal court seemed to concur that the question of 
72. !d. at 1095 (holding that a student who claimed violation of the IDEA where his school 
district did not offer him an exit interview prior to graduation did not make any claim that this 
alleged violation was a denial of a FAPE and that he therefore was not entitled to relief). 
73. Sch. Bd. of Collier County, Fla. v. K.C., 285 F.3d 977, 982-83 (lith Cir. 2002). 
7 4. Jd. at 982 (citations omitted). 
75. Knable ex rei. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 f.3d 755, 764-67 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 533 U.S. 950 (2001). 
76. Jd. at 764 ("Even if we conclude that [the school district] did not comply with the Act's 
procedural requirements, such a finding does not necessarily mean that the [plaintiffs] are entitled to 
relief. Rather, we must inquire as to whether the procedural violations have caused substantive 
harm ... ") (citations omitted). 
77. I d. at 767. 
78. Adam/. ex rei. Robert]. v. Keller Ind. Sch. Dist., 328 f.3d 804,811-12 (5th Cir. 2003). 
79. I d. at 812-13. 
80. Jd. 
652 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2006 
procedural violation goes hand-in-hand with a question of substantive 
harm. 
B. Judicial Treatment of Failure to Include a "Regular Education Teacher" 
on the IEP Team 
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of procedural defect in Deal v. Hamilton 
County Board of Education, 81 (which was argued, decided and filed 
during the same time period as M.L.) relied heavily on the legislative 
purpose of the regular education teacher requirement. 82 In this case, the 
district court found that the failure to include a regular education teacher 
on the IEP team did not cause substantive harm. The Sixth Circuit agreed 
that this defect did not cause substantive harm, but nevertheless reversed 
the lower court's holding, citing the close connection between this 
requirement and the IDEA's important "least restrictive environment" 
goal.83 While the court recognized that not all procedural violations 
merit relief without a showing of resultant substantive harm,84 it basically 
said failure to include a regular education teacher was one exception. In 
essence, the court awarded the parents some level of relief despite a 
determination that the defect had not substantively affected their child's 
placement or educational opportunity. 
A federal district court in New York offered a well- reasoned opinion 
on the issue of the regular education teacher requirement in Arlington 
Central School District v. D.K. ex rei. C.K. 85 With little or no precedent 
with regard to this specific procedural violation, the court reviewed other 
federal circuit courts' conclusions with regard to other types of 
procedural violations that only procedural errors which actually result in 
substantive harm can invalidate an IEP.86 The facts of Arlington, as the 
court explained, suggested that a regular education teacher could provide 
valuable input into the IEP development. 87 Given these facts and the 
legislative preference for mainstreaming where possible, the court 
determined that there was a "rational basis" for finding that the lack of a 
regular education teacher's perspective resulted in an inadequate IEP.88 
81. 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 422 (2005). 
82. I d. at 860-61. 
83. Id. at 860-61, n. 15 ("The regulation explicitly requires the attendance of a 'regular 
education teacher of the child.' . . . The regulation does not state an exception where other 
knowledgeable people are present."). 
84. I d. at 854. 
85. 2002 WL 31521158 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2002). 
86. I d. at *8. 
87. I d. at *9. 
88. I d. at **8-9. 
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In essence, once the court found a procedural violation, it then asked if 
there was any rational basis for believing the procedural violation could 
result in substantive harm. 
These cases, however, do not control the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
M.L. The closest the Ninth Circuit has come to addressing the failure to 
include a regular education teacher on the IEP team is in the 1992 case, 
W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23.89 
Arising before the 1997 IDEA amendments which specified the inclusion 
of a "regular education teacher," this case dealt with the failure to include 
the student's "regular classroom teacher," or in other words, the teacher 
that was most knowledgeable about the student.90 The IEP team in 
Target Range failed to seek input from any teacher at the student's private 
school who was knowledgeable about the student.91 The Ninth Circuit 
formulated for the first time its application of the first prong of the 
Rowley test, suggesting that this prong seeks not only a finding of 
procedural error but also a finding that this error resulted in the denial of 
a FAPE.92 This analysis essentially created a precedent suggesting that the 
failure to include a required teacher is a procedural violation which 
results in denial of a F APE. 
C. Comparison of Case Law Precedent and M.L. 
In M.L., Judge Alarcon adopted a structural defect approach which 
differs from the former approaches of the Ninth Circuit or its sister 
circuits in analyzing procedural error. The general trend in federal courts 
has been to review the procedure for error and then analyze whether that 
error had the substantive effect of denying a child a F APE, inferring this 
denial where the student showed lost educational opportunity or lack of 
parental involvement. The failure to include a regular education teacher 
has rarely arisen in federal court, and on these occasions courts have 
been particularly sensitive to this defect because of its clear connection to 
the legislative goals of mainstreaming. Likewise, Judge Alarcon was 
sensitive to the importance of this particular procedural requirement, but 
his approach is distinctly unconventional. His arguments were similar in 
substance to more typical procedural error analysis (i.e. that the facts 
suggest M.L. might have been placed in a regular classroom,93 that the 
89. 960 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992). 
90. Id.at 1484. 
91. Id. at 1482, 1484. 
92. Id. at 1484. The Ninth Circuit continued applying the first prong of Rowley in this manner 
in other cases. See supra nn. 51-67 and accompanying discussion of Amanda f. and Shapiro. 
93. M.L., 394 f.3d at 648. 
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procedural violation was therefore "significant"94 and deprived the IEP 
team of the general education perspective, and that this error essentially 
denied M.L. educational opportunitl5), but he arranged these arguments 
under the label of "structural defect," which "precludes" a review of the 
substantive effect of this error.96 This "per se" standard raises the 
question of how such a standard might be applied to other types of 
procedural errors which are perhaps of lesser substantive significance.97 
In short, Judge Alarcon's unconventional approach left the door open; 
the issue of procedural error and its effect on an IEP remains 
unpredictable. 
V. REALITY CHECK: APPLYING IDEA AND ITS REGULAR EDUCATION 
REQUIREMENT 
How does M.L. relate to the reality of IEPs as viewed by educators 
and education scholars throughout the country? Articles in various 
special education journals articulated for their readership the significant 
changes in the 1997 amendments of the IDEA-among these changes, 
the requirement that a regular education teacher be involved in the IEP 
process. This requirement is generally recognized by educators as one 
which serves the IDEA's goal of more effectively mainstreaming special 
education students. These and other articles emphasize the value of 
mainstreaming; in particular, teacher communication and training are 
vital components of this mainstreaming process. However, while the 
regular education teacher requirement is viewed as a good thing by many 
educators, it also has a few practical and real difficulties. As school 
districts make the changes necessary to bring IEP procedures into full 
compliance with the IDEA 1997 amendments, the question of judicial 
involvement also remains uncertain. 
A. The Regular Education Teacher Requirement and Mainstreaming, As 
Per Educators 
Educators view the 1997 IDEA amendments as significantly 
94. I d. at 646. 
95. Jd.at646,648. 
96. Id. at 636; see also id. at 648 ("! conclude that the failure to include at least one regular 
education teacher, standing alone, is a structural defect that prejudices the right of a disabled student 
to receive a FAPE."). 
97. Id. at 655, n. 7 (Gould, C.)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Judge 
Alarcon's opinion posits no necessary or logical stopping point prohibiting future courts from 
applying a structural error approach to virtually any IDEA procedural error."). 
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changing IDEA application in schools.98 In an article which details these 
changes for the benefit of teachers and administrators, the authors 
recognize that individual changes, such as the regular education teacher 
requirement, reflect a major shift toward educating special needs 
students in the regular education system where possible.99 Thus, general 
education becomes the basis for all education, and special education 
takes on the role of supplementing this general education for students 
with special needs. 100 
Since generally there is a perceived gap in communication and 
understanding between special education and general education 
teachers, 101 educators and scholars feel that an increase in collaboration 
is vital to the success of mainstreaming efforts. 102 The IDEA '97 mandate 
to involve a regular education teacher in IEP development with special 
education teachers and others should help to increase communication 
98. See e.g. Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunities of the IEP Requirements under 
IDEA '97, 33 j. Spec. Educ. 195, 195 (2000) (recognizing that the new requirements of the 1997 IDEA 
have "significant implications for both general and special educators"). 
99. Mitchell L. Yell & james G. Shriner, The IDEA Amendments of 1997: Implications for 
Special and General Education Teachers, Administrators, and Teacher Trainers, 30 Focus on 
Exceptional Children 1, 4-5 (Sept. 1997) (noting that the general education teacher requirement 
"reflects the emphasis on general curricular involvement found throughout the IDEA"). 
100. Id.; jeannie Kleinhammer-Tramill, An Analysis of Federal Initiatives to Prepare Regular 
Educators to Serve Students with Disabilities: Deans' Grants, REG!, and Beyond, 26 Teacher Educ. 
and Spec. Educ. 230, 238 (2003) ("For the first time, the legislation attributed primary responsibility 
and accountability for all students with disabilities to regular education and clarified special 
education's role as providing support to the regular education system."); Lawrence). O'Shea et al., 
IDEA '97 and Educator Standards: Special Educators' Perceptions of Their Skills and Those of General 
Educators, 23 Teacher Educ. and Spec. Educ. 125, 125 (2000) ("IDEA '97 signals that general 
education curricula must be viewed as the starting place for all students."). 
10 I. See e.g. Roy Brookshire & jack Klotz, Selected Teachers' Perceptions of Special Education 
Laws 4, http:/ /www.eric.ed.gov/ERI CDocs/ data/ ericdocs2/ content_storage_O 1 /OOOOOOOb/80/28/ 
18/a9.pdf (Nov. 2002) (suggesting that the lack of emphasis on special education in the university 
curriculum for regular education teachers "tends to build a gap between regular education teachers 
and special education teachers"); Thomas C. Lovitt & Suzanne Cushing, Parents of Youth with 
Disabilities: Their Perceptions of School Programs, 20 Remedial and Spec. Educ. 134, 136 (1999) 
(stating that parents are often surprised and dismayed to realize that their child's regular education 
teacher is unaware of the child's special needs); O'Shea, supra n. 100, at 135 (suggesting that special 
educators' responses to a survey on general and special education curricula "may reflect a pervasive 
school culture characterized by a lack of interactions and support between general and special 
educators") (citation omitted). 
102. Various articles by educators and scholars emphasize the need to increase collaboration 
and offer practical suggestions on doing so. See e.g. Sally Vargo, Consulting: Teacher-to-Teacher, 
Teaching Exceptional Children 54, 54 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (citation omitted) (recommending a basic 
model for special education and regular education teacher collaboration); see also Yell & Shriner, 
supra n. 99, at 18 ("A more collaborative relationship between general educators and special 
educators is likely to be needed. Planning, implementing, and evaluating instructional programs will 
necessitate more frequent communication across disciplines than is sometimes found in today's 
schools."). 
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and thereby lessen that gap. 103 Educators recognize benefits of complying 
with the requirement, such as increased opportunity for general 
education teachers to obtain needed support and to provide insight into 
educational possibility, 104 as well as acquire greater understanding of 
special education options. 105 
B. Problems and Unanswered Questions in Instituting the Regular 
Education Teacher Requirement 
While educators recognize the regular education teacher requirement 
and its purpose, they also face practical concerns and questions in its 
application. One education article deals with the underlying problems of 
regular education teacher involvement in an IEP, stating that while the 
value of this involvement is clear, "we [educators] know the reality of 
what happens in actual practice."106 The article lists five basic reasons 
that regular education teachers are not present at IEP meetings: team 
connection (i.e. lack of a sense that the regular teacher is valued and 
understood), lack of time, lack of effective preparation, lack of training, 
and lack of apparent relevance of the IEP to the regular education 
teacher's interactions with the student.107 
These problems create questions which have not yet been answered. 
For example, if IEP meetings are scheduled during a teacher's contract 
day, should funds be allocated to hiring a substitute teacher during these 
meetings? Could one general education teacher be designated to attend 
all IEP meetings, or could the assignment to attend IEP meetings rotate 
through a group of teachers? Could the requirement be filled by a 
guidance counselor in lieu of actual classroom teachers?108 In essence, 
despite statutory limitations on the regular education teacher's 
involvement, teachers are feeling the strain of additional responsibilities. 
103. See e.g. Susan G. Clark, The IEP Process as a Tool for Collaboration, Teaching Exceptional 
Children 56, 58, 60-61 (Nov.-Dec. 2000) (recognizing value in the perspective of a general educator 
in identifying needed supplementary aids or program modification as well as in creating and 
implementing behavioral goals); Margaret ]. McLaughlin et al., Integrating Standards: Including All 
Students, Teaching Exceptional Children 66, 66 (Jan.-Feb. 1999) (noting that the IDEA's regular 
education teacher requirement "reinforces the importance of collaboration" (emphasis added)). 
104. Huefner, supra n. 98, at 203. 
105. O'Shea, supra n. 100, at 135. 
106. Ronda R. Menlove et a!., A Field of IEP Dreams: Increasing General Education Teacher 
Participation in the IEP Development Process, Teaching Exceptional Children 28, 29 (May-june 
1998). 
107. I d. at 28-32. 
108. Each of these possibilities is mentioned in a report consisting of research on the question 
of the regular education teacher requirement. Nat!. Assn. of St. Dirs. of Spec. Educ., Involvement of 
General Education Teachers in the IEP Process 4-6, http:/ /www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ 
ericdocs2/content_storage_Ol!OOOOOOOb/80/11!43/Sb.pdf (Dec. 1998). 
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As a result, schools may look for creative responses, which may or may 
not fulfill the legislative requirement. 109 
C. The Issue of the Judicial Role 
Through the IDEA, collaboration between regular and special 
education teachers, a generally-recognized ideal, becomes a legal 
requirement and has real legal implications. Some education authors 
create checklists intended to help school districts comply with the 
extensive procedural provisions of the IDEA, reminding educators that if 
these "most critical procedural requirements of IDEA" are not followed, 
the school district risks legal repercussions. 110 One author recognizes that 
the specific failure to include a regular education teacher may raise a 
concern of predetermination; that is, school districts risk liability with 
this particular error because it may imply an inappropriate pre-IEP 
decision that a student would not qualify for any portion of regular 
education.lll Indeed, M.L.'s story raises this precise concern: does the 
FWSD's failure to include a regular education teacher on the IEP team 
suggest the School District had already determined that regular 
education was not an option? 
While education journal articles warn educators of potential liability 
for failure to comply with the IDEA, the courts' role in enforcing this 
compliance is still somewhat nebulous. One educator laments the 
potential for "more intrusiveness by the legal system"112 as a result of 
IDEA changes which "will surely generate a new wave of court cases 
testing their limits."113 She questions what courts will do with the IDEA's 
increased emphasis on measurable results or how, if at all, courts will 
address IEP substance and concludes that "the judicial response to the 
new IEP requirements bears watching." 114 The Ninth Circuit's decision 
in M.L. is a piece of this anticipated judicial response. The adoption of a 
per se standard avoids excessive intrusion, in that any finding of a 
procedural violation bars substantive review of IEP appropriateness. 
Thus, the question of substantive compliance remains in the hands of 
!09. Some sources impliedly refute these creative possibilities. For example, one IEP checklist 
of "the most critical procedural requirements of IDEA" states that "[t]he general education teacher 
participating in the meeting should be the teacher who is, or may be, responsible for implementing 
the IEP." Erik Drasgow et al., Developing Legally Correct and Educationally Appropriate IEPs, 22 
Remedial and Spec. Educ. 359, 362 tbl. 1 (2001). 
!10. Jd. at 369-70 fig. 2. 
111. Clark, supra n. I 03, at 58. 
112. Huefner, supra n. 98, at 196. 
113. Jd. at 195. 
114. I d. at 202. 
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administrators and ALJs. The plurality opinion in M.L., however, shows 
that this resolution is far from final and definitive. Indeed, educators and 
courts alike are still left wondering: what role should federal courts play 
in the enforcement of the IDEA's procedural and substantive provisions? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The IDEA's regular education teacher requirement adds important 
elements to IEP meetings for special education students. Through this 
requirement, the special education student receives the benefits of the 
regular education teacher's perspective and an added focus on 
mainstreaming opportunities. These benefits can increase educational 
opportunity for the student. As mainstreaming becomes an increasingly 
important goal in special education, educators recognize, from the 
theoretical perspective, the value of collaboration between regular and 
special education teachers. However, these educators also face various 
practical difficulties, in fulfilling the requirement, such as limitations on 
time and resources. 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in M.L. v. Federal Way School District 
leaves questions regarding the IDEA regular education teacher 
requirement essentially unanswered. While the legislature, the courts, 
and educators all agree that the requirement is a significant and valuable 
aspect of the IDEA's important goal of including special education 
students in regular education classrooms, the enforcement of this 
provision remains unclear. The various opinions arising out of the Ninth 
Circuit's plurality holding demonstrate the lack of a general consensus 
with regard to this particular procedural error. While it seems fairly clear 
that M.L. should have had the right to a regular education teacher's 
perspective in the formulation of his educational plan, educators and 
administrators generally remain in the dark as to the details of this 
procedural requirement. Will this type of procedural defect always result 
in a decision for the student, or is there room for a showing of no 
substantive harm? How do the judicial tests apply to other procedural 
errors, and which test will be applied? Indeed, the adoption of a per se 
standard by Judge Alarcon contradicts the procedural error analysis 
applied by other circuits, which generally consider whether the error 
actually resulted in the loss of educational opportunity. 
In summary, and perhaps of greatest importance to educators, the 
plurality opinion in M.L. still did not refine for educators how to actually 
apply the regular education teacher requirement. How far will courts go 
in analyzing regular teacher participation in IEP development meetings? 
With the court's lack of consensus, educators cannot discern with any 
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reasonable certainty if courts will invalidate every procedural error or if 
courts will be willing to consider whether or not the error actually 
harmed the student. Although the IDEA expressly limits regular 
education teacher involvement in order to avoid overburdening teachers, 
the judicial adoption of a per se standard would infringe on educators' 
discretion in determining the appropriate level of involvement of the 
regular education teacher. Educators' concerns about application of the 
requirement therefore remain unresolved. In short, the issue of a regular 
education teacher's involvement in IEP development reveals unclear gaps 
in the law, and the Ninth Circuit in M.L. does little to clarify them. 
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